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Abstract
In this paper we review the literature on static entry games and show how they can be used to
estimate the market structure of the airline industry. The econometrics challenges are presented, in
particular the problem of multiple equilibria and some solutions used in the literature are exposed.
We also show how these models, either in the complete information setting or in the incomplete
information one, can be estimated from i.i.d. data on market presence and market characteristics.
We illustrate it by estimating a static entry game with heterogeneous firms by Simulated Maximum
Likelihood on European data for the year 2015.
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1 Introduction
Being able to evaluate the nature of competition between firms in a given sector and how it has
changed over time or with a new economic environment is an important feature of the empirical
IO literature. The use of the Herfindhal index has been proved to be a poor proxy of the degree of
competition (see Sutton, 1991). Ideally, one would like to get data where both supply and demand
could be estimated. However, such data are often difficult to get, to the exception of the data
provided by the US Department of Transportation for the US interior market. Entry games are
therefore very popular in the empirical Industrial Organization (IO) literature because they allow
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to study the nature of competition between firms from data that are generally easy to collect.
Observing how firms operate in different markets with different characteristics allows the empirical
economist to estimate how these characteristics affect the profitability of each potential player and
how the entry of an additional competitor harms everyone’s profit.
In this chapter, we seek to explain how static entry games can be used to estimate the decision of
a firm to operate or not in a market by endogeneizing everyone’s decision. These models have been
estimated in the empirical IO literature in many sectors including the airline industry (Bresnahan
and Reiss, 1991a, 1991b, Berry, 1992, Mazzeo, 2002, Seim, 2006, Cleeren et al. 2009, Grieco,
2014, among plenty other contributions).1 Although the estimation of an entry model raises some
econometrics issues, that are exposed in this chapter, the alternative option of estimating standard
ordered choice models is a bad idea because it implicitly considers that the firms’ decisions to
operate or not are independent, an assumption ruled out by the data.
Additionally, most of the entry games are games with multiple equilibria unless some order
of entry is assumed.2 It creates potential identification issues and requires adapted econometric
techniques to handle it. We present some of the solutions used in the literature and introduce
briefly the recent advances on moment inequality models that permits to consider more general
entry games.3 In this review, we focus on static games with simultaneous moves. Contrary to
dynamic games, one should view an entry as a decision of being active in a market rather than
entering /exiting a market in which there are incumbents and potential entrants. Estimating a
dynamic game poses other econometrics’ challenges which are out of the scope of this chapter.4
First, in Section 2, we present the literature on static entry games with complete information
where all firms observe the profitability of all other competitors. We introduce in particular the
specification of Berry (1992) for heterogeneous firms, which encompasses Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991a) homogeneous version. Understanding this seminal paper is sufficient to understand the
further developments of this literature. Some of them are introduced at the end of the section.
Then, in Section 3, we extend our presentation to the case of models with incomplete information
where firms decide to enter before observing everybody’s profit shocks. In Section 4, we briefly
review applied papers which have estimated entry games for the airline industry. Finally, in Section
5, we propose a short illustration of the potentialities of an entry game on European data collected
for 2015 from the Official Airline Guide. Section 6 concludes.
1See Berry and Reiss (2007) for a survey.
2Assumptions often combined with additional minor assumptions.
3See de Paula, 2013, for a full survey.
4Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) and Bajari et al. (2013) propose a survey including dynamic games.
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2 Entry games of complete information
In this section, we present the standard entry game with complete information and simultaneous
moves widely used in empirical Industrial Organization. In these type of models, firms decide to
be active in a given market if the profits collected after the entry decision are positive. Here, all
the firms observe their profitability shocks as well as the ones of their competitors. However, the
applied economist does not observe them and, usually, postulates a parametric distribution for these
shocks. We focus on Berry (1992), which encompasses as a special case the homogeneous version of
Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a). These two models are the basis of more complex models introduced
later in the section. As in any structural or semi-structural economic model, the question of the
identification of the profit function is at stake. A discussion about the identification of entry games
can be found in Tamer (2003) and Berry and Tamer (2005).
2.1 The standard entry game with heterogeneous firms
Let Np be the number of firms potentially active in market m. In the standard game, we assume
that the profit of an active firm, labeled i, in a market with N∗ active firms, is equal to
pii,m(N
∗) = pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ)− h(N∗; δ) + εi,m. (1)
The usual normalization is to assume that a non-entrant firm gets a profit of 0. In Equation (1), Xm
is a vector of market characteristics, Zi,m is a vector of firm i specific characteristics for market m,
pi(X,Z; θ), a parametric profit function known up to a vector of parameters θ. h(N ; δ) is a strictly
increasing in N , positive, parametric function that drives the degree of competition. It captures
the property that more competitors harms profits.5 First, note that there are many possibilities to
introduce heterogeneity among the firms. Here, we only assume that the profit function depends on
the firm characteristics whereas the impact of competitors only matters through their number and
not their identity. As we shall see shortly, this specification pose practical problems for empirical
researchers, the most important one being the possibility to have multiple equilibria.6 Note that
we can easily extend the model by allowing both pi(X,Z; θ) and h(N ; δ) to be firm specific, i.e.
pii(X,Z; θ) and hi(δ,N) without changing any of the derivations made in this section.
7 Finally,
εi,m represents a profit shock for firm i in market m, unobserved to the econometrician. It allows
markets with similar observed characteristics to have different equilibrium outcomes. Profit shocks
5With the normalization h(1; δ) = 0 when there is the constant term in Xm. Berry (1992) uses h(N ; δ) = δ logN
whereas Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) estimate each value h(2; δ), h(3; δ), etc. separately.
6The extensions in Section 2.2 consider specifications which relax some of these constraints, still finding solutions
to treat the multiple equilibria problem.
7See Bontemps and Kumar (2019) for the problem of multiple equilibria for this augmented specification.
3
are correlated within each market. These shocks are observed by all firms who could potentially
enter (complete information) and who decide, simultaneously, to enter or not.
In Berry (1992), the profit pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ) is linear in the explanatory variables, i.e. pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ) =
X>mβ + Z
>
i,mγ, where > denotes the transpose operator. The market characteristics, Xm, are the
product of the population at the two end-points served by the airline, the distance between the two
end-points, its square and a dummy variable for tourist markets. The firm characteristics, Zi,m are
some measures of airport presence, i.e. a dummy if the airline is operating from the two end-points
the period before and a measure of market share at these two end-points. We consider similar
characteristics in Section 5.
In this model of complete information, firm i decides to enter in a market m with N∗ active
firms if pii,m(N
∗) ≥ 0, otherwise it does not enter. The action yi,m taken by firm i in market m is
therefore yi,m = 1{pii,m(N∗) ≥ 0} and, obviously,
N∗ =
Np∑
i=1
yi,m.
Consequently, for each marketm, the actions yi,m, i = 1, . . . , Np are the solutions of the simultaneous
equation system:
yi,m = 1{pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ)− h(y1,m + y2,m + . . .+ yNp,m; δ) + εi,m ≥ 0}, i = 1, 2, . . . , Np. (2)
Therefore, the entry game makes the market structure endogeneous. First, the simultaneous
equations in (2) prevent us from estimating the parameters of the model with the econometric
procedures designed for standard binary models because of the endogeneous variables on the right
hand side of Equation (2).8 Additionally, estimating a probit or a logit while omitting the actions
yi,m on the right hand side implicitly makes the assumption that more competitors don’t change
each firm’s profit, an assumption rejected in most of the cases. Consequently, the estimators would
be inconsistent. Therefore it is crucial to characterize the solutions of this system of equations.
This is the objective of the next part.
2.1.1 The problem of multiple equilibria
Assume for the sake of simplicity that there are only two potential entrants, 1 and 2, and that the
equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibria in pure strategies. Adapting Equation (1), our entry
8One could estimate this system using instrumental variables, but estimating binary models with endogeneous
explanatory variables is notoriously more complicated than for the linear case. See Blundell and Powell (2003), for
example.
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Figure 1: The multiple equilibria problem with 2 potential entrants
game can be summarized as follows:
y1,m = 1{β1,m − δy2,m + ε1,m ≥ 0}, (3)
y2,m = 1{β2,m − δy1,m + ε2,m ≥ 0}. (4)
Here, with the notations above, βi,m = pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ) for i = 1, 2 and are generally different because
of the firms’ heterogenity assumption. Figure 1 plots the different regions of interest.
In region I, the profit shocks are too negative and no firm is profitable even in monopoly, nobody
enters, i.e., y1,m = y2,m = 0. In region IV, the shocks are very high and both firms can be profitable
even with one competitor. Both enter, i.e., y1,m = y2,m = 1. In region II, we have two subcases
(separated by the dashed line). In region II-A, firm 1 is not profitable even in monopoly and firm
2 is profitable. Consequently, y2,m = 1 and y1,m = 0. In region II-B, firm 1 is profitable only
in monopoly, whereas firm 2 can sustain a competitor. Consequently, firm 2 enters and firm 1,
knowing that, does not. Consequently, y2,m = 1 and y1,m = 0. Analogously, in region III, y1,m = 1
and y2,m = 0. Finally, in region V, each firm is profitable in monopoly but is not in duopoly. Without
further information or another equilibrium concept, the model can not predict the outcome. Either
y1,m = 1 and y2,m = 0 or y2,m = 1 and y1,m = 0. This entry game with heterogeneous agents is a
game with multiple equilibria.
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The multiple equilibria problem prevents the econometrician from estimating the model with the
usual techniques because there is no one-to-one mapping between the regions and the four possible
outcomes. Region V predicts either (1, 0) (i.e. y1,m = 1 and y2,m = 0) or (0, 1). The model is said
incomplete because we don’t know what the mechanism of outcome selection in region V is.9 There
are different solutions to tackle this problem.
2.1.2 Solutions to the problem of multiple equilibria
In order to solve the problem raised by the multiple equilibria, the econometrician has a few so-
lutions. First, one can add some assumptions to complete the model, like in standard problems
of missing information in economic models. Bajari et al. (2010) assume large support for the
profit shocks, leading to point identification and the possibility to estimate the equilibrium selec-
tion mechanism of this model.10 One can also make assumptions about the order of entry of the
different firms. Bjorn and Vuong (1985) assume that the order is purely random whereas Berry
(1992) proposes one estimator where the most profitable firm enters first. For the latter, Region V-A
now predicts the outcome (0, 1) whereas Region V-B predicts (1, 0). Consequently, the probability
to observe the outcome (1, 0) is the sum of the areas of the Regions III and V-B with respect to
the true distribution of (ε1,m, ε2,m) and, we can calculate similarly the probability of observing the
outcome (0, 1). This solution is ad-hoc, of course, and suffers from the risk of misspecification, i.e.,
adding a wrong assumption that may bias the estimators.
Another solution consists in using the recent literature on moment inequalities and set identi-
fication (see Tamer, 2009 or Bontemps and Magnac, 2017, for a survey). It is out of the scope of
this chapter to introduce formally this econometric solution but the general idea is to bound the
probability of each outcome.11 Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) are the first to apply this literature on
entry games. For example, in Figure 1, the probability of observing the outcome (1, 0) is bounded
by the probability that the shocks belong to region III and the probability that they belong to region
III or V. Similarly, the probability of observing the outcome (0, 1) is bounded by the probability
that the shocks belong to region II and the probability that they belong to region II or V. Using
such bounds allows to exploit all the information provided by the structure of the model and leads
to more precise estimates of the parameters of interest. However, generalizing this to more players
is cumbersome and requires more sophisticated inference techniques.
9See also Heckman (1978).
10See, also Tamer (2003).
11Moment inequality procedures are now well developed in the partial identification literature, which includes
contributions by, among others, Chernozhukov et al. (2007), Andrews and Soares (2010) and Beresteanu et al.
(2011). It becomes complicated and numerically challenging for entry games with more than 5 players. Bontemps
and Kumar (2019) propose a computational solution for games with more players.
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Bresnahan and Reiss (1991b) observe that, in the case with two players considered above, despite
the presence of a multiple equilibria region, the number of firms entering is always the same. The
inference can therefore be conducted from the number of firms rather than the set of actions. Here,
the probability of observing 0 firm entering is the area of region I, 2 firms entering is the area of
region IV, and 1 is the sum of the areas of region II, III and V. Nevertheless, this simplification
is at the cost of having less precise estimators because of some informational loss ; for example,
the probability to observe the outcome (1, 0) is at least greater than the area of region III, an
information no longer taken into account in the new strategy. However, it allows to estimate the
model by standard techniques, here maximum likelihood, as the one-to-one mapping between regions
of shocks and number of firms is restored.
2.1.3 A simulated estimator
In his seminal paper, Berry (1992) generalizes the last example to the entry games with more than
two potential entrants. The number of multiple equilibria regions is much higher than with two
potential entrants. It increases exponentially (8 regions with 3 entrants, 81 regions with 4, 2008
regions for 5 entrants, etc. Bontemps and Kumar (2019) provide, in particular, an exact counting).
Berry (1992) proves that, nevertheless, the number of active firms is constant in these regions. The
key assumption is to assume that the impact of the competitors on each firm profit does not depend
on their identity (the function h(N ; δ) does depend only on N in Equation (1) and does not vary
when we switch one active firm and one non entrant). 12
Therefore, like for the case with two entrants, one can estimate the entry game from the number
of entrants in each market. We assume that we observe M independent markets, m = 1, . . . ,M
in which the Np firms compete. The characteristics Xm, Z1,m, . . . , ZNp,m and the profit shocks
ε1,m, . . . , εNp,m are assumed to be identically distributed and independent across markets
13 Our
goal is to estimate the parameters θ of the profit function, δ of the function h(N ; δ) and, the
correlation matrix of the within market profit shocks, ε1,m, . . . , εNp,m (in its simplest form, one can
assume, like in Berry, that εi,m = ρu0,m +
√
1− ρ2ui,m, where all the shocks uj,m are independent
and standard normally distributed ; u0,m is the market shock common to all firms). Let us denote
α the vector gathering all parameters in θ, δ and ρ and P (N∗m;α), the probability of observing N
∗
m
12Bontemps and Kumar (2019) show that this result remains valid when the function h(·) depends on the firm
identity as long as this is the number of competitors which matters in the profitability, i.e., for the specification
pii,m(N
∗) = pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ)− hi(N∗; δ) + εi,m.
13There may be correlation within markets for the profit shocks like in Berry (1992). Jia (2008) is the first one
to depart from the iid assumptions. She analyzes competition between K-Mart and Wal-Mart with network effects.
Her model is applicable for games with two players only.
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active firms at the equilibrium. One can estimate α by maximum likelihood:
αˆMLE = arg max
α
(
L(α) =
M∑
m=1
logP (N∗m;α)
)
.
If one estimates a probit model without common market shock (assuming δ = 0 and ρ = 0), we
have a closed form for P (N∗m;α). However, such restrictions are generally empirically rejected. The
homogeneous version of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991a) is also a particular example of the model for
ρ = 1 and homogeneous firms (i.e., no Zi,m) in which we obtain a closed form for the likelihood (it is
an ordered model, see Bresbahan and Reiss (1991a) for further details). Generally, due to the huge
number of regions involved and their difficulty to be characterized explicitly, it is not possible to
get such an explicit form. However, one can use simulated methods to estimate (across simulations)
P (N∗;α) for each α using the following algorithm proposed by Berry (1992). The algorithm consists
of six steps which are detailed now.
Algorithm for simulating P (N∗m;α) for any α:
Step 1: Choose the number of simulations S (at least 500).
Step 2: For each s in 1, . . . , S, and for each m, draw iid sequences u
(s)
0,m, u
(s)
1,m, . . . , u
(s)
Np,m
from the
standard normal distribution.
Step 3: Choose a value for the vector of parameters α. The next three steps estimate P (N∗m;α).
Step 4: For each market m and each s, compute Φ
(s)
i,m = pi(Xm, Zi,m; θ) + ρu
(s)
m +
√
1− ρ2u(s)i,m, for
i = 1, . . . , Np.
Step 5: For each market m and each s, calculate from these Φ
(s)
i,m’s, the number of active firms at the
equilibrium in market m for simulation s, N
∗,(s)
m , by counting how much firms are profitable
in a market with 1, 2, 3, ... active firms.
Step 6: For each market m, calculate the empirical frequency, ̂P (N∗m;α), of observing the outcome
N = N∗m across simulations:
̂P (N∗m;α) =
1
S
S∑
s=1
1{N∗m = N∗,(s)m }.
One can now estimate α from observing market characteristics and decision of firms to enter or
not by maximizing the Simulated Maximum Likelihood (SML):
Lsim(θ) =
M∑
m=1
log ̂P (N∗m;α),
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where, for each step in the optimization procedure, ̂P (N∗m;α) is estimated using the algorithm above
with a unique and fixed sequence of random terms.
The SML estimator is consistent but asymptotically biased. When S is sufficiently large, this
bias can be neglected. The standard errors can be computed using the classical variance formula,
assuming S is large enough to neglect the simulation impact.
2.1.4 The results of Berry (1992)
Berry estimates the decision to enter for airlines in markets whose end-points are two of the 50
largest cities of the United States.14 The simulation method proposed above is slightly modified by
adding in Step 4, an order of entry. It is therefore possible to estimate on top of the number of
active firms, the probability of entering for each firm in each market.
One particular empirical finding is the importance of airport presence at both end-points to
explain the decision to operate between two end-points and a numerical evaluation of this impact.
This result can be put in perspective, for example, with the empirical findings of Goolsbee and
Syverson (2008), where it is shown that the threat to entry (i.e. being present at both end-points)
would put a pressure on the active firms even if the airline does not serve the corresponding market.
Also, the larger the market size, the higher the probability to enter. This effect is quantified and
one can estimate which markets are under exploited. Besides, based on estimated parameters of
the model, it is also possible to simulate the number of entrants in different market configurations.
Furthermore, Berry’s model encompassing the homogeneous model of Bresnahan and Reiss
(1991a) and also the probit model where the competitor’s presence does not harm each firm profit
(δ = 0), these restrictions can be tested empirically. They are rejected by the data.
2.2 Extensions
The assumption that the profitability of one airline does not depend on the identity of its competitors
may seem extreme in the case of the airline sector where at least two types of firms are present,
Full Service carriers and Low-cost carriers (even three with the regional version of the Full Service
carriers). However, relaxing this assumption is difficult because of the problem of multiple equilibria.
This problem is recurrent in this literature.
14There is no clear consensus about what is the right market definition, i.e. city pairs or airport pairs and whether
the markets are directional or not. For example, Berry (1992), Berry and Jia (2010) consider cities whereas Ciliberto
and Tamer (2009) and Ciliberto, Murray and Tamer (2018) consider airports. Any assumption can be handled within
this framework.
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Cleeren et al. (2010) assume that there are two types of firms which decide whether to enter or
not in a version of the game where firms within each type are exchangeable. Their model is applied
to competition between supermarket chains with traditional supermarket chains and discounters.
Multiplicity of equilibria is dealt with by adding assumptions about the nature of competition
between types and by selecting the equilibria with the highest number of traditional supermarket
chains, which are argued to have entered the market first. Mazzeo (2002) proposes an equivalent
version in which the format (or the quality) is also endogeneized. He considers two or three quality
levels. Again, the multiple equilibria problem is solved by assuming a sequence of quality choice.
Both models can therefore be estimated by maximum likelihood.
Bajari et al. (2010) goes one step further into estimation of complete information games with
equilibrium selection, by, instead of picking one selection rule, explicitly modeling and estimating
the probability that each one of several equilibrium selection possibilities will be played on a game.
A number of studies (Mazzeo, 2002; Jia, 2008; Cleeren et al., 2010; Sampaio, 2011) that specified
a sequential order of movement to solve for the multiple equilibria also investigated the robustness
of their results to alternative order of movements, and found fairly similar coefficients to profits
functions under the alternative specifications.
Finally, Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) introduce much more heterogeneity on firms’ profit func-
tions. They also apply their model to the US domestic airline industry and allow each variable
(market and firm observed characteristics) and competition effect to potentially differ among air-
lines. Not surprisingly, such flexibility comes at a cost of more general multiple equilibria structure.
They estimate their model using moment inequalities. They find that the competitive effect of Full
Service Carriers on other FSC is smaller than the competitive effect of FSC on Low Cost Carriers
(excluding Southwest). Furthermore, these effects are not symmetric, in the sense that the effect of
American Airlines (AA) on a LCC’s profit is greater than the effect of a LCC entry on AA’s profit.
Finally, the competitive effects of Southwest and Full Service Carriers are symmetric.
3 Entry games of incomplete information
The previous section have analysed entry models under the assumption that part of airlines’ profits
are unobserved by the econometrician, but are common information detained by all airlines that
could potentially enter the market.
We now investigate how to recover airlines’ profits assuming that information about a specific
airline profitability is privately held by that airline, thus not being shared by their competitors as
well as the econometrician.
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With incomplete information, the equilibrium concept used is the Bayes-Nash equilibrium, in
which airlines base their entry decisions on expected profits. The models presented here were
developed in the context of static entry models by Seim (2006) and Bajari et al (2010). Also, we
report the reader to Bajari et al. (2013) for a survey of the econometrics with game interactions.
In this section, we first look into an entry game with only two players. Then, we extend this entry
game to multiple competitors.
3.1 The case of 2 firms
Let yi,m denote a dummy variable representing the entry decision of airline i in market m. Profits
of not entering a market are also normalized to zero. The profit function of an active firm is the
same than in the complete case, i.e., in Equation (3) or (4). Firm i gets the following profit if it
enters :
pii,m = pii(Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δy−i,m + εi,m, (5)
where −i denotes the rival’s index (−i = 1 if i = 2 and vice versa). In the usual linear setting, like
the one considered above, pii(Xm, Zi,m; θ) = X
>
mβ + Z
>
i,mγ but, again, any parametric specification
is possible. Like above, δ represents the decrease in airline i profits caused by the actual entry of
airline −i. Now, εi,m, the profit shock, is unknown to both airline −i and the econometrician. It is
assumed that εi,m has an extreme value distribution to guarantee some analytical tractability to the
computation of the equilibrium of the game. This distribution is common knowledge of the players
and the econometrician.15
Then, since airline 1 does not observe airline 2’s profit shock, but knows its distribution, its
entry strategy is based on its own expected profits on market m:
y1,m = 1⇐⇒ E [pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δy2,m + ε1,m| Information of firm 1] ≥ 0
⇐⇒ ε1,m ≥ −pi1 (Xm, Zi,m; θ) + δE [y2,m] .
In the derivation above, the only uncertainty comes from the non observation of ε2,m and its
impact on the expected value of y2,m. Since y2,m is a dummy variable, E [y2,m] corresponds to the
probability that airline 2 actually enters the market, Prob(y2,m = 1). Let σ2,m represenst this
probability.
The probability that airline 1 enters market m, also known as airline 1 best response function,
depends on the probability that airline 2 also enters market m. With the extreme value distribution
15Up to some parameters for the econometrician, eventually.
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for ε1,m:
σ1,m = Prob (y1,m = 1) = Prob (ε1,m ≥ − (pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δσ2,m))
=
exp (pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δσ2,m)
1 + exp (pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δσ2,m) . (6)
Similarly, airline 2 best response function is given by:
σ2,m = Prob (y2,m = 1) =
exp (pi2 (Xm, Z2,m; θ)− δσ1,m)
1 + exp (pi2 (Xm, Z2,m; θ)− δσ1,m) . (7)
The equilibrium of the game, (σ∗1,m, σ
∗
2,m), corresponds to the solution of equations (6) and (7)
for each market m. The problem of multiple equilibria present in the entry games with complete
information still arises here. To solve this problem, we have to assume some form of uniqueness of
equilibrium across markets or over time. As discussed in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2003), if
we have data on the same market in multiple periods of time, it is easier to support the assumption
of uniqueness of equilibria. However, in airlines entry models, we typically gather information of
multiple origin-destination markets. In this case, we need the same equilibria
(
σ∗1,m, σ
∗
2,m
)
to emerge
in markets having the same market share and the same airlines characteristics, (Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m).
Following the uniqueness assumption, Seim (2006) and Bajari et al. (2010), propose a two-step
method of estimation of the parameters of the model, which is easy to implement using standard
commands of statistical softwares. In the first step, the entry probability of each airline, σ1 and
σ2, is estimated as depending on all available information on market and airlines’ characteristics,
(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m), but ignoring the interactions between players decisions.
16 Estimation can be
performed using a parametric model, such as a logit model, or a nonparametric model, such as a
local linear model.
In the second step, interactions between airlines decision are brought back, by plugging the
estimates of σ̂1(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m) and σ̂2(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m) obtained from the first step in equations (6)
and (7), so that:
σ1 =
exp (pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δσ̂2(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m))
1 + exp (pi1 (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δσ̂2(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m))
and
σ2 =
exp (pi2 (Xm, Z2,m; θ)− δσ̂1(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m))
1 + exp (pi2 (Xm, Z2,m; θ)− δσ̂1(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m)) .
Finally, the parameters of interest (θ, δ) can be recovered with the estimation of the following pseudo
log-likelihood:
L (θ, δ) =
M∑
m=1
2∑
i=1
yi,m log
(
exp (pii (Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δσ̂−i(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m))
1 + exp (pii (Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δσ̂−i(Xm, Z1,m, Z2,m))
)
,
16Tamer (2003) also proposes it for the complete model with two players.
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which is actually just a conditional logit likelihood estimation.
3.2 The case of multiple firms
The last entry model can be very easily extended to multiple players. Suppose now that there are
Np potential players in each market.
In a simple model with symmetric competition effects of different rival airlines, if airline i decides
to enter in market m, it collects profits given by:
pii (Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δ
∑
j 6=i
yjm + εi,m,
where, once again, εi,m is private information to airline i and is assumed to have an extreme value
distribution. Profits of not entering a market are also normalized to zero. The decision to enter
a market is based on expected profits, which alongside the extreme value distribution, yields the
following best response function for airline i:
σi,m =
exp
(
pii (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δ
∑
j 6=i σjm
)
1 + exp
(
pii (Xm, Z1,m; θ)− δ
∑
j 6=i σjm)
) , ∀ i = 1, . . . , Np.
The Bayes-Nash equilibrium is now implicitly defined by a system with Np unknowns (σ
∗
i,m, i =
1, . . . , Np) and Np equations.
The multiple equilibria problem still arises and is solved by assuming that there exists a unique
equilibrium in the same market over time or in a cross-section of markets, like in the case with two
players. The estimation of the model is done likewise in two steps.
In a first step, σi,m is estimated based on market and all airlines characteristics (Xm, Z1,m, . . . , ZNm)
in this market. Given this first step estimates, σ̂i,m = σ̂i,m(Xm, Z1,m, . . . , ZNp,m), the parameters of
interest can once again be estimated by maximum likelihood on the log-likelihood:
L (θ, δ) =
M∑
m=1
Np∑
i=1
yi,m log
 exp
(
pii (Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δ
∑
j 6=i σ̂jm
)
1 + exp
(
pii (Xm, Zi,m; θ)− δ
∑
j 6=i σ̂jm
)
 . (8)
Note that the model above can easily accommodate the case where an airline might decide
between K options. The unobserved profit shocks now are action specific, that it, each possible
action is associated to a different error term, and it is unknown to their competitors. As before,
competitors know the distribution of these error terms, but not the specific realization that occurred
in a market. The solution to this problem follows the same two steps of the simple entry game.
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3.3 Discussion and extensions
This section has presented a simple version of an entry game with incomplete information, with
the main goal of illustrating the traditional assumptions made in the literature. As discussed, the
biggest advantage of the private framework is that the estimation of game parameters are much
simpler than in complete information set up, since it can be easily performed on available software
commands at low time cost, without any simulations being necessary. This simplification is also
driven by the fact that it is assumed explicitly that the same strategy is played across observations
when there may be multiple equilibria. This is a strong assumption and deriving bounds like in the
complete case would be a solution that could be investigated more systematically though it is not
the case yet.
One argument that has been put forward in the literature in favor of the complete information
assumption is the following: since static entry models are supposed to represent firm’s long run
decisions, there should be no ex-post regret, which is a property of Nash equilibria. In games with
incomplete information, since decisions are made ex-ante, before knowing the real realization of
their competitors unobserved profits, airlines may be surprised by the entry (or lack of entry) of
their competitors and end up with ex-post realized profits that do not correspond to their most
profitable action.
Einav (2010) incorporate sequential moves into entry games with incomplete information to
study competition in movies release dates. This model derives a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
even for quite heterogeneous profit functions. Conditional on a fixed order of moves, estimation can
be easily done with maximum likelihood. The author argues that, with sequential choices, there
is less ex-post regret, since firms that move later on have more information on which to base their
decisions.
There is no consensus in the literature on what is the most appropriate assumption about the
degree of information on the unobserved profitability shared by competitors on entry models of
airlines. To the best of our knowledge, no unifying framework has been developed.
The set-up of games with private information also provided a nice framework to dynamic consid-
erations on entry models. In the dynamic setting, ex-post regret is no longer an issue, since airlines
are allowed to freely enter and exit markets as long as they pay some sunk costs. Aguirregabiria
and Mira (2007) and Bajari et al. (2013) offer excellent surveys of dynamic structural econometric
models with more in depth details about estimation, inference and efficiency.
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4 Entry games applied to the airline sector
In this section, we present some of the ”structural” empirical entry games papers applied to the
airline industry in the recent years. Some are static models, some are dynamic models. There is
also a huge and vast literature of reduced form estimations (see, for example, Bogulaski et al., 2004,
or de Oliveira, 2008)) which is not cited here.
4.1 Complete Information
Sampaio (2011) uses Cleeren et al. (2010)’s model to study competition between low-cost and
full-service airlines. The model is estimated with the assumption that full-service carriers enter
the market first and then low-cost carriers make their decisions. Results suggest the existence of
strong competition effects on this industry. Entry of same type rivals has a large significant effect
on profits. Besides, entry of low-cost carriers seems to affect more profits of full-service airlines than
vice-versa.
Dunn (2008) also introduces product quality to entry models. He studies competition between
airlines offering non-stop and one-stop routes to investigate cannibalization and business stealing
competition effects. One-stop routes passing through hubs are taken as fixed, and entry with non-
stop services is modeled with a game theoretical model a` la Berry (1992). However, the inclusion
of a cannibalization effect in the model implies multiple equilibria in the total number of firms with
non-stop operations in a market, and, to deal with this problem, the author selects the equilibria
with the highest number of entrants. Their results suggest both the presence of strong competition
effects as well as relevant cannibalization effects.
On the same direction of Mazzeo (2002) and Cleeren et al. (2010), Blevins (2015) investigates
entry models with complete information and sequential movement in the US domestic industry.
Now, the order of moves is not observed (or assumed) by the econometrician. Instead it is estimated
alongside the coefficients of the profit function. In contrast to Mazzeo (2002) and Cleeren et al.
(2010), and similar to Berry (1992), the model focus on pure entry, without product differentiation,
but it allows firm observed heterogeneity.
Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) introduce much more heterogeneity on firms’ profit functions. They
also apply their model to the US domestic airline industry and allow each variable (market and
firm observed characteristics) and competition effect to potentially differ among airlines. The
complicated multiple equilibria problem (there is no obvious outcome invariant in the multiple
equilibria regions) is tackled by using moment inequalities. They found evidence of a greater
impact of an entry of Southwest on the three major airlines’ profits compared to the impact of the
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entry of another major airline.
4.2 Incomplete Information
An important contribution of dynamic entry models to the airline industry is the ability to analyse
network effects of entry decisions and to rationalize hub-and-spokes networks. Static models usually
incorporate network effects via a hub dummy variable or market presence. In contrast, Aguirre-
gabiria and Ho (2010, 2012) create the concept of local managers that maximize profits of several
interconnected routes inside an airline’s network, so that the airlines recognize that entering in one
route affect profits on other routes. This also creates scope for entry deterrence effects, since airlines
might enter a route with negative profits, as long as they are compensated by positive profits on
the rest of the network. The entry threat is credible to potential most efficient competitors in one
specific route, since no profits loss is actually incurred by the network airline at each period of time.
In the before mentioned papers, they document relevant network effects on the sunk entry cost as
well as large entry deterrence effects.
Benkard et al. (2018) advocate the need of introducing dynamic considerations on merger
analysis to understand medium and long run effects of a proposed merger, since potential negative
short run effects of a merger implied by an increase in concentration might be offset by the entry
of other potential competitors. They use a simplified version of Bajari et al. (2007) estimation
method to investigate the effects of three proposed mergers in the airlines industry between 2000
and 2010. Interestingly, their long run analysis would motivate a competition authority conduct
at odds with what was actually adopted in practice. Their model is however much less flexible
than Aguirregabria and Ho (2012) and does not allow for entry deterrence effects. Thus it remains
the question of how entry deterrence effects might affect medium and long run competition after
mergers.
Finally, Gillen et al. (2015) analyse the relationship between network and regional airlines in a
game with three stages. In the first stage, network airlines decide the number of regional airlines
they are going to sign contracts with. In a second stage, they chose if they are also going to operate
the market with their own fleet. In the last stage, each of the regional airlines determines how
many passengers to serve, independently, given their knowledge of the traffic provided and served
by the network airlines. Their model is an extension of the classical incomplete information entry
game where, instead of modeling a 0/1 decision, one models the choice of an integer ni,m, here, the
number of regional airlines airline i is contracting with.
Except for the inclusion of terms related to the number of contracts signed by all network airlines
with regional airlines, the best response function of network airlines can be estimated following the
procedure described in the previous section. Their results for both stages corroborate the existence
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of negative network airlines competition effects on each other in both stages (δ > 0). They also
indicate a positive correlation between its own number of contracts with regional airlines and its
decision to also operate in a market.
5 Example on European Data
We now illustrate the approach by estimating a static entry game with complete information on
western European data for the year 2015. The data were collected from the Official Airline Guide
database (OAG) which contains all posted flights for the year 2015, their schedules and eventually,
their code share agreements.
A market is defined as an Origin/Destination flight (non directional) between two European
cities. We therefore group the different airports of a given city (London, Paris).17 We restrict our
investigations to the decision to operate between the 50 most populated cities of Western Europe.18
The distance between these cities and the socioeconomic variables such as GDP and population of
the metropolitan areas are collected from additional statistical sources.19 We eliminate markets for
which the distance between the cities is less than 150 kilometers; 1,204 potential markets remain.
Contrary to the US market, the western European market has more players. Each country has
its own flag carrier which plays usually a significant role in the industry20. We group the different
airlines as follows. The first fifteen airlines in number of routes, see Table 1, are kept as they are. All
the other airlines are gathered according to their alliance membership (if any), otherwise according
to their type.21
17We also grouped Alicante and Valencia, Malaga and Sevilla.
18These cities are Amsterdam, Antwerp, Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Birmingham, Bilbao, Bordeaux, Bristol,
Brussels, Copenhagen, Cardiff, Dresden, Dublin, Duesseldorf, Frankfurt, Glasgow, Goteborg, Hannover, Hamburg,
Helsinki, LeedsBradford, Lille, Lisbon, London, Liverpool, Lyon, Madrid, Manchester, Milan, Marseille, Munich,
Naples, Newcastle, Nottingham, Nantes, Porto, Oslo, Paris, Palermo, Roma, Rotterdam, Thessaloniki, Stockholm,
Stuttgart, Sevilla, Torino, Toulouse, Valencia, Vienna.
19Eurostat.
20British Airways, Lufthansa, AirFrance, KLM and Alitalia are among the top 15 airlines counting for 85% of the
traffic
21We have the first fifteen airlines Ryanair, Easyjet, Vueling, Lufthansa, Germanwings, Norwegian, SAS, Air
Berlin, British Airways, Air France, TAP, Alitalia, Aer Lingus, Iberia and KLM. We have therefore 5 additional
fictive airlines, StarAlliance2 which gathers Brussels Airlines, Aegean Airlines, Austrian airlines mainly, Skyteam2
which gathers Transavia, Garuda, Air Europa, Hop and Czech Airlines, Oneworld2 which gathers Finnair, Niki,
Main others which gathers all classic airlines, and LC2 which gathers all the other Low Cost airlines.
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5.1 Descriptive statistics
In 2015, 900 million of passengers were transported. The most frequented routes were Paris-Toulouse
and Barcelona-Madrid with respectively 3.5 and 2.5 millions of passengers. Out of the possible 1204
markets, we observe 670 existing connections. Table 1 and 2 present some descriptive statistics of
the final dataset.
Most of the growth in markets served from 2014 to 2015 is due to an increased activity of Low-
cost carriers who opened 95 markets out of 148 new markets. They serve around 41% of the routes
with a share in seats offered of approximately 29.4%. On average, there are 2 airlines per market
served. Less than 6% of the markets have more than 4 competitors.
Following Berry (1992), we consider the following explanatory variables for the profit function:
• Pop is the geometric mean of the population of the metropolitan areas of the two cities of the
market in millions. It is a proxy for the market size.
• Gdppercap is the mean GDP per capita of the metropolitan areas of the two cities of the
market in thousands of euros per capita.
• Dist is the distance in thousand of kilometers, Dist2 is its square.
• Sun is a dummy equal to 1 if one of the endpoints is on the Mediterranean Sea.
• LC is a dummy for Low Cost airlines.
• City2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the airline serves both cities in the city pair.
• Nbroutes is the mean number of cities served by the airline out of the two endpoints.
Table 3 displays some descriptive statistics of these variables. Table 4 presents the results of
the OLS regression of the number of firms on the exogeneous market characteristics (distance,
population, gdp, dummy for sun cities). It allows us to measure how these characteristics impact
the number of active firms, but does not permit to estimate the competitive effect δ. All variables
but the dummy Sun are significant.
5.2 Results of the estimation and comments
We use a Simulated Maximum Likelihood method to estimate the static entry game with complete
information. The profit function has the form of Equation (1), more specifically,
pii,m(N) = β
>Xm + γ>Zi,m − δ logN + ρum +
√
1− ρ2ui,m︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εi,m
,
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where the market variables Xm are Pop, Gdppercap, Dist, Dist2 and Sun whereas the firm specific
variables are LC, City2 and Nbroutes. The results are displayed in Table 5. We also put the results
of a probit estimation without the interaction term (i.e. assuming δ = 0) and assuming ρ = 0.
The results are totally different as expected. δ, the interaction parameter is significantly positive.
Assuming (wrongly) that the value is equal to zero leads to biased estimates.
The percentage of good predictions22 is equal to 78.1%.
Like in Berry (1992), we obtain the expected signs. When the size of the cities grows, it is more
likely to serve the corresponding market. The effect of distance is first increasing than decreasing
from 1,357 kms. It captures the fact that people fly more to distant cities but less when it starts
to be too far.
More importantly, the coefficient of City2 is positive and very important. Airport presence is
a good predictor of the decision to enter in a market. The more important is the presence, the
more likely the airline will enter. The interaction coefficient δ is positive as expected. Finally ρ is
positive and captures the fact that profits shocks within market are correlated across firms.
We can now use these estimates to evaluate in which markets, not served in 2015, airlines are
more likely to enter by checking in which markets the discrepancy is the highest. We report in
Table 6 the top ten markets distant from at least 500 kms. Among these 10 markets, 7 are actually
served in 2019. Alternatively, we report in Table 7 the top ten markets for which the model predicts
too much entry. We report the number of competitors for the year 2019. 7 markets out of these
ten markets have experienced a decrease in the number of competitors. The model can obviously
be better adapted to the European context by taking into account the fragmentation of countries
and their relation to their flag carriers. More specific characteristics could be tested but this is left
for additional research. The goal of this section is to show what kind of results we can expect and
how they can be used to predict some market structure change in markets between top European
cities.
6 Conclusion
In this review, we present the static entry games with complete or incomplete information. These
models are useful to estimate market structure from data that are relatively easy to obtain. The
problem of multiple equilibria has been exposed. It complicates the estimation procedure. Despite
the fact that it occurs in both information cases, complete or incomplete, it has been treated more
seriously in the games with complete information.
22We set that the prediction is right when the true number of competitors is either equal to the integer part of our
mean predicted number or to the next integer.
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The recent literature on moment inequality models could propose a unified treatment of the two
cases. By a revealed preference argument a choice is made because any other one would have been
less optimal. These inequalities are however difficult to handle in a game with a medium number
of players. Nevertheless this is an interesting way to work on.
Most of the empirical work on entry games, applied to airlines, have considered the US market.
The data are easy to collect, available online and the market has only a few large players. We hope
that the online access to flights proposed in other continents would allow researchers to study more
systematically the market structure of the airline sector in Europe and Asia.
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List of Tables
Airline Type Nb Routes Served Tot seat Share
2015 2014 offered1
Ryanair L 195 173 36,036 11.5%
Easyjet L 158 139 31,245 9.9%
Vueling M 88 76 15,875 5.1%
Norwegian L 73 68 11,164 3.6%
Lufthansa M 71 71 39,219 12.5%
Germanwings L 69 58 9,592 3.1%
SAS M 64 61 16,156 5.1%
Air Berlin M 47 46 12,325 3.9%
British Airways M 39 38 22,270 7.1%
Air France M 38 38 22,087 7.0%
TAP M 38 38 8,253 2.6%
Alitalia M 36 29 10,334 3.3%
Aer Lingus M 36 32 7,595 2.4%
KLM M 34 34 13,496 4.3%
Iberia M 34 30 11,890 3.8%
Main Others M 87 71 7,876 2.5%
StarAlliance2 M 76 71 16,017 5.1%
SkyTeam2 M 70 61 10,841 3.5%
LC2 L 58 32 4,382 1.4%
OneWorld2 M 33 30 7,462 2.4%
1: in millions.
Type= M for mainline and L for Low-cost.
Table 1: Number of markets served between the top 50 cities of Western Europe.
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N 2015 Freq. Percent Cum.
0 534 44.35 44.35
1 268 22.26 66.61
2 223 18.52 85.13
3 108 8.970 94.10
4 55 4.570 98.67
5 11 0.910 99.58
6 4 0.330 99.92
7 1 0.080 100
Total 1,204 100
Table 2: Number of competitors per market.
VARIABLES N mean sd min max
N 2015 1,204 1.116 1.283 0 7
Pop (in millions) 1,204 2.4 1.2 1.1 12.8
Gdppercap (in ’000 euros per cap) 1,204 38.8 10.5 14.4 72.7
Dist (in kms) 1,204 1,167 617 156 3,362
Sun 1,204 0.370 0.483 0 1
City2 1,204 0.212 0.409 0 1
Nbroutes 1,204 4.66 8.48 0 75.5
Table 3: Explanatory variables.
Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
(Intercept) -1.3590 0.1782 -7.63 0.0000
Pop 0.5782 0.0244 23.65 0.0000
Gdppercap 0.0203 0.0031 6.50 0.0000
Dist 0.3987 0.1753 2.27 0.0231
Dist2 -0.1052 0.0621 -1.69 0.0903
Sun 0.0597 0.1654 0.36 0.7181
Table 4: Regression of N on the market characteristics
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Estimate (Std. Error) Probit
(Intercept) -2.616 (0.044) -3.163 (0.123)
Pop 0.090 (0.009) 0.060 (0.013)
Gdppercap -0.0003 (0.0001) -0.004 (0.002)
Dist 0.342 (0.033) 0.560 (0.119)
Dist2 -0.126 (0.012) -0.178 (0.042)
Sun 0.0002 (0.002) -0.068 (0.101)
LC -0.121 (0.058) -0.001 (0.040)
City2 1.518 (0.056) 0.783 (0.040)
Nbroutes 0.047 (0.002) 0.076 (0.002)
δ 0.274 (0.030)
ρ 0.306 (0.025)
Table 5: Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimates.
N2015 Predicted Diff Market Distance 2019 (airline)
0 1.58 1.58 Brussel-Glasgow 808
√
(Ryanair)
0 1.7 1.7 Bordeaux-Manchester 955
√
(Ryanair& Easyjet)
0 1.86 1.86 Berlin-Marseille 1,177
√
(Easyjet)
0 1.74 1.74 Lille-Roma 1,200 No airline
0 1.68 1.68 Birmingham-Stockholm 1,360
√
(SAS)
0 1.68 1.68 Glasgow-Milan 1,504 No airline
0 1.9 1.9 Birmingham-Lisbon 1,623 No airline
0 1.54 1.54 Athens-Toulouse 1,996
√
(Aegean Airlines)
0 2.48 2.48 Athens-Valencia 2,119
√
(Aegean Airlines)
0 2.12 2.12 Athens-Malaga/Sevilla 2,615
√
(Aegean Airlines)
Table 6: Market where entry is predicted.
N2015 Nmodel Diff Market Distance N2019
5 1.24 -3.76 Roma-Vienna 777 3
5 1.68 -3.32 Paris-Palermo 1,471 2
6 2.74 -3.26 Porto-Paris 1,224 6
4 0.96 -3.04 Copenhagen-Dublin 1,239 3
7 4.04 -2.96 Lisbon-Paris 1,454 5
5 2.3 -2.7 Copenhagen-Roma 1,535 3
4 1.48 -2.52 Barcelona-Birmingham 1,273 2
4 1.5 -2.5 Glasgow-Sevilla 1,966.5 4
4 1.5 -2.5 Marseille-Roma 608 3
4 1.54 -2.46 Madrid-Porto 436 4
Table 7: Market where there is too much entry.
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